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I  Introduction 
This chapter examines the changing relationship between London, the Thames and upstream 
communities during a time of fundamental change. The 1973 Water Act replaced local water 
undertakings in England and Wales with large regional authorities organised around river 
basins. In London, powerful bodies responsible for water supply, sewerage and pollution 
control ceded these functions to a new Thames Water Authority.1 The move to river-basin 
management sparked widespread protest about the loss of local democracy here and 
elsewhere. Debates around these key urban functions had been central to London’s political 
life since the early nineteenth century. A strong body of urban and public health history 
addresses earlier debates, but little attention has been paid to the historical implications of 
this new regional development even within discussions of a late twentieth-century “decline of 
urban governance.”2 This radical shift deserves examination, both for its implications for 
democratic governance and for the ways in which rivers and communities in the Thames 
region were reconceived during this time. 
Two main issues are addressed. The first concerns the relationship between London and the 
rural and urban communities of the upper Thames – part of the capital’s “ecological 
hinterland.”3 Did the move towards integrated river basin management balance resources 
more evenly across the 5,000 square mile Thames catchment? Or did it allow for London's 
greater dominance, in the context of long-standing tensions between London and upstream 
communities? The second concerns the impact of regional, technocratic river management on 
localised democratic governance in London and across the region. Was a cohesive Thames 
region achievable or desirable? Is there any scope for seeing this Thames catchment or 
“watershed” as “the natural home of democracy” of Donald’s Worster’s vision? Or did this 
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development “hollow out” political processes in the Thames region, resulting in what Oliver 
Graefe has called a “post political environmental region”?4  
A “spatial mismatch” between local government boundaries and the complex 
interdependencies of large urban spaces has been noted. 5 But the boundary-crossing nature of 
rivers presents particular challenges for governance. Rivers provide a vivid example of the 
way cities are connected to their economic and ecological hinterlands and “involuntary 
neighbours” by flows of water, sewage, pollution and refuse, as well as trade. They force you 
to look beyond what Barry Doyle has referred to as the ‘sealed” boundaries of local 
governments.6 This study of the shifting relationship between a city and its river basin aims to 
expand the terrain of urban history. 
In critical analyses of the UK water industry, the rise of river-basin management from the 
1970s has been associated with the erosion of local democracy – a development seen as 
completed by water and sewerage privatization in 1989. This period saw the death of a long-
established connection between water ratepayers and rights to representation in relation to 
local authority undertakings. (In Britain, domestic water rates were linked to property values, 
like other local taxes, rather than to metered consumption.) Castro, Kaïka and Swyngedouw 
express an influential view (referring to developments up to 1983): “[t]hese measures 
significantly reduced the public accountability of water management …, which increasingly 
became the preserve of a techno-scientific and managerial elite.”7 Understanding the impacts 
of regional managerialism on democratic processes requires further investigation of what 
public accountability meant before these developments. 
The mercurial quality of ‘democracy’ – its diverse and contested meanings across water 
sectors in different contexts – complicates this discussion. In the US, for example, researchers 
have looked at the promise and failures of popular participation in river basin management, 
from the visionary nineteenth-century watershed movement to the ‘grassroots democracy’ 
claims of the Tennessee Valley Authority (established 1933), alongside assessments of 
current arrangements. There has been no comparable historical exploration of river basins in 
the UK, though public participation has become a focus within social science literature on 
natural resources management.8 Since the expansion of piped domestic water in nineteenth-
century Britain, conflicts over democracy in water supply have involved broadly two issues. 
Firstly, debates have concerned rights to water use, including access to clean, sufficient water 
at an affordable and fair price, just allocation of water resources, and a say in water 
conservation decisions for example over the siting of reservoirs. Secondly, debates have 
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centred on modes of governance and the best means of securing these rights – frequently 
identified with forms of public ownership of water, and with local government representation 
of water consumers' interests.9 Debates around the River Thames, too, were infused 
throughout this period with notions of the river as a public resource. But democratic claims 
around water and river management have long been contested: supporters of public 
ownership and representation have battled with those advocating private ownership and 
expert-led management. The ‘public’ itself has included a multitude of conflicting interests.  
A narrative of lost democracy in discussions of UK river-basin management may have relied 
on idealized versions of earlier structures of representative local democracy and public 
accountability. There have always been significant problems with public access to decision-
making for rivers and water resources. The Thames catchment in the twentieth century was a 
tangle of statutory and non-statutory agencies, “blurred accountabilities” and “‘backroom’ … 
consultations”10 involving national government, semi-representative public bodies, industry 
associations, local authorities, and interest, amenity and community groups. This chapter 
traces an evolution from nineteenth-century calls for catchment boards to river-basin 
management in the 1970s, and the severance of local links to water and river services that 
followed. It ends with a brief discussion of water privatisation in 1989, which further 
complicated the regional picture. To what extent did the re-organisation of water and river 
management from local to regional units transform political space? 
 
II   London and the Nineteenth-Century Thames 
<insert Table 1 about here> 
Table 1 indicates the changing governance structures for three stretches of the Thames from 
1850 to 2000: the freshwater river, the tidal river in London and the estuary downstream. A 
range of public and commercial bodies was responsible for river-related functions, including 
navigation, the port, conservancy, pollution control, water supply, sewerage, land drainage, 
flood protection, fisheries, recreation and riverside development. The Thames Conservancy 
was the first of its kind, established in 1857. A semi-representative body comprised of 
sectional interests and key local authorities, it was responsible for navigation and 
conservancy on the Thames from its Gloucestershire source to the sea (after 1909, up to the 
tidal limit at Teddington). The 1850s also saw the first city-wide authority for London, a new 
tier above local authorities: the Metropolitan Board of Works, with responsibilities for 
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sewerage, land drainage and flood protection. This was replaced in 1889 by the more 
powerful London County Council (LCC). “Water London,” an area extending beyond LCC 
borders, was supplied by eight private water companies. Water supply, sewerage and 
pollution were integral to the “London Government Problem.” How was London’s growing 
population to be governed and supplied? Who should own and control its utilities? How 
should power be balanced between metropolitan and local government, and between London 
and outlying areas?11 Water featured prominently in “Progressive” Liberal campaigns of the 
1890s, calling for public ownership of supply and control by the LCC as a democratic body. 
When water was made public in 1904, however, it was transferred to a "public corporation" – 
the Metropolitan Water Board (MWB) – with the LCC and other local authorities allocated 
Board representatives. The LCC was bypassed again in the public takeover of London’s 
private dock companies through another public corporation: the Port of London Authority 
(PLA, established in 1909). The PLA managed navigation, conservancy and pollution control 
on the tidal river. For Progressives in the early 1900s, the opportunity for democratic control 
of the river's port, conservancy and water supply had already been lost.  
From the early years of the twentieth century, therefore, the river and water supply in and 
around London were managed by bodies that were closely associated with the capital’s 
political elites but whose public accountability was highly circumscribed. These 
organisations formed part of a wider, fluctuating pattern of “delegated governance” in 
Britain. Contemporary criticisms focused on their non-accountability and “particularism,” 
being structured around representation of particular interests (such as shipowners on the PLA 
board).12 Historians of London have also viewed the MWB, PLA and Thames Conservancy 
in this light. Up to 1973, these organisations sat awkwardly alongside the universalist 
aspirations of metropolitan government, itself engaged in struggles with local authorities and 
the public inside and outside its own borders.13 The river generated conflicts of interest and 
competing communities that could not be addressed adequately by the forms of public 
accountability and participation offered by local government or public corporations. 
 
III  Catchments and Communities of Interest 
The mid nineteenth century saw the emergence of demands for river catchment conservancy 
boards in England with a series of parliamentary reports and bills appearing from the 1860s, 
prompted by concerns over agricultural land drainage and flooding. Drainage problems pitted 
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upstream against downstream, uplands against lowlands, and agricultural landowners against 
towns. Conservancy board advocates argued that land drainage should be a collective 
responsibility funded by local taxes on the grounds of a “community of interest.” At an 
investigation in 1877, many called for “representative bodies” with control over the “whole 
water-shed … of each river.” Upland landowners objected that there was no such community: 
individuals should manage their own land.14 The pressure for conservancy boards also 
represented a growing recognition of the interconnectedness of river and groundwater 
systems. Those interested in the capital’s water supply talked increasingly of the water lying 
in the chalk and limestone of the upper Thames region. London’s future water needs were a 
persistent focus for public debate: the freshwater Thames itself could not meet the needs of a 
city using over 150 million gallons a day by the 1880s. But interconnectedness created 
conflicts of interests between communities. As The Times put it following a failed scheme to 
pump water to London from a gravel bed at Dorney, Buckinghamshire, in 1888: 
“those who are interested in the land forming the river basins from 
which our supplies … are drawn are becoming indignant … under a 
system which grew up … when scientific knowledge concerning the 
sources of the water which fills our rivers was in its infancy.”15 
 
Conservancy boards did not become widely established until 1930, when land drainage and 
flood protection boards were created for English and Welsh catchments. Their functions were 
expanded with the creation of River Boards in 1948, then again with River Authorities in 
1963 (with the Thames and the Lea Catchment Conservancy Boards surviving this process).16 
Central government was at the same time moving gradually and unevenly towards the 
amalgamation of water undertakings, greater regional planning and larger local government 
units, but these were distinct developments: there was no consistent strategic link in the early 
years between the management of river catchments and land-use development.17 Well into 
the post-war period there were divergent strategies for providing water for urban growth, as 
demonstrated by two separate groundwater schemes in the Thames area. 
Firstly, the 1940s saw the MWB's ambitious plan to create an expanded “Greater London 
Water Area” to increase the available pool of water (Figs. 1 and 2 ). <insert Figs 1 and 2about 
here> The area selected (inside the dotted line, Fig 1) roughly coincided with the regional 
“Greater London” boundaries of Patrick Abercrombie’s post-war reconstruction plan (1944). 
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The area formed, the MWB emphasized in 1947, “a single hydro-geological unit.” 
Importantly, this was not the Thames catchment but part of the London Basin, a geological 
structure covering much of south eastern England; an area said to be “unique” for its 
abundant groundwater and for being "so favoured economically by having … supplies 
naturally and continuously … delivered … from a peripheral, sparsely-populated catchment 
zone into a central, densely-populated district … .” There was, the MWB suggested, “a 
considerable … community of interest and interdependence throughout the area within 30 to 
40 miles from the centre of London.” Economies of scale and equalisation of water rates were 
just two of the promised benefits. At a 1947 government committee considering the plan, Sir 
Cyril Radcliffe spoke on behalf of water undertakers around London. Radcliffe is better 
known for his role in a more high profile act of community engineering that year: the 
partition of India. Here he challenged MWB’s claims about a “natural area” with “one 
community.” Despite regional planning developments, he said, there were still “many 
communities … run as separate communities.” It was clear to see that the area was centred on 
London.18 
It was, however, the scheme's governance that split the committee. The majority favoured 
separate divisions led by boards representing local authorities; the minority, a single authority 
with an expert committee. London boroughs sought representative management on the basis 
that “water supply is not so much a public utility … as a public health service.” Under Labour 
leader Lord Latham, the LCC backed the small, appointed committee: water was “a service 
largely of a technical and 'commercial' character akin to those of electricity and passenger 
transport,” at that time being nationalised. The Ministry shelved the matter pending the 
Labour Government’s (unrealised) water nationalisation plans.19 The London Basin scheme 
was divided, then, both by competing claims over resources and by conflicting views of the 
nature of water – divisions that were to resurface in the 1970s. The LCC’s position indicates 
the distance it had travelled from its early campaigns for public control of water. 
This was followed by a less grandiose plan that represents a significant shift towards a 
catchment approach. The Thames Conservancy had been surveying groundwater in the upper 
Thames since the late 1950s, after a reservoir proposal had been blocked by local opposition. 
Their borehole scheme, co-sponsored by the MWB, was officially announced following the 
1963 Water Resources Act. Through a system of “stream flow augmentation,” groundwater 
was to be pumped into tributaries such as the Kennet and Lambourn to supplement the flow 
of the Thames towards London. The scheme aimed to offer an additional 200 million gallons 
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a day, and was promoted as cheaper and more economical in land-use terms than surface 
reservoirs, but it created numerous conflicts around community entitlement to groundwater.20 
<insert Fig 3 about here> 
Significantly, these were more piecemeal conflicts than the opposition to the earlier MWB 
plan. When the “Lambourn Pilot Scheme” was announced in 1965, the local water board and 
farmers around Newbury objected that local rivers would dry out. Lord Hurd, a leading 
Berkshire landowner, objected to the plan as “an intrusion”, calling for “a competent body of 
local people sitting with the committee considering the pilot.” Thames Conservancy pointed 
out publicly that Berkshire already had a member on their board, but there were opportunities 
for “backroom consultations” with powerful vested interests: local National Farmers Union 
members gained financial compensation, and the Lambourn Scheme went ahead in 1965. The 
full-scale “Thames Ground Water Scheme (Stage I)” began after a public inquiry in 1972 and 
was rolled out by the newly formed Thames Water Authority (TWA). Further public inquiries 
followed the announcement of the scheme’s expansion in the Cotswolds (1980) and at 
Gatehampton, Berkshire (1987), currently 'the largest ground water abstraction project in 
Europe').21 
The Thames Ground Water Scheme indicates both the momentum that could be gained with 
official sanction and the growing importance of river basins for regional plans. Sub-
catchments increasingly lost out to river basins; urban hotspots identified in regional plans 
shaped the priorities and outcomes of public inquiries. The mid 1960s also saw a shift in the 
balance of power between riparian owners (with customary abstraction rights) and water 
agencies. Under the 1963 Water Resources Act, abstractions for private supplies were now to 
be licensed by River Authorities with new powers to develop water resources.22 A plan to 
augment supplies for Swindon, Wiltshire, in the 1950s and ’60s illustrates these changes. 
When in 1957 the Borough of Swindon sought to pipe groundwater from the rural parish of 
Axford in the Kennet valley (around 16 miles to the south), it met strong opposition from the 
local landowners, fisheries interests and residents of the Kennet Valley Protection 
Association (KVPA).23 Swindon’s application was tacitly supported by Thames 
Conservancy, who had a long-standing policy of opposing exports beyond the catchment 
while allowing transfers across sub-catchments.24 The KVPA’s consultant geologist 
challenged the validity of this policy, pointing out that water piped to Swindon would return 
not to the Kennet but to the Thames (via the River Ray): 
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“[t]he Kennet is entirely a Chalk-stream, and the removal of its 
water (or that of its catchment area) to a part of the Thames 
drainage-system that comes from … the Jurassic rocks, involves an 
unreplaced loss of water from the Chalk area.”25  
The Axford community were up against the regional plans of central government – Swindon 
was a major growth town – and a public inquiry went against the Association. When Lady 
Burdett-Fisher (a KVPA member with watercress beds) refused permission for the borehole 
to be sunk on her land, Swindon used powers acquired under the 1948 Water Act to proceed. 
An abstraction of 13.1 megalitres a day was licensed in 1965 (Fig 4).26 <Fig 4 near here> 
The development of multi-functional river-basin agencies was not inevitable even at this 
stage, however. In preparing the Water Resources Bill in the early 1960s, government 
officials had struggled to address the anomalous historic position of the Port of London 
Authority (PLA) as pollution authority for the tidal Thames and considered transferring its 
powers to the Thames Conservancy. While this would have created a single authority for the 
river (bringing the Thames into line with other rivers), it would also 
“have the effect of uniting two areas with little or no common 
interest and … producing a large majority representing urban 
London, an area which would have little concern with some of the 
authority’s principal interests – land drainage and fisheries – but 
would be the chief source of river pollution.” 
“[T]he difficulties of establishing a satisfactory river authority for the whole Thames 
basin,” were considered “quite without parallel.”27 Within ten years, however, the 
multi-functional single authority approach had been established nationwide. 
 
IV   Democracy, Local Government and River Basins 
Under the 1973 Water Act, river, water and sewerage agencies in England and 
Wales were absorbed into ten multi-functional Regional Water Authorities (RWAs). 
Thames Water Authority (TWA) took over ten water undertakings and 163 sewerage 
operators.28 The Act represented both a long-term trend towards larger units in water 
and sewerage governance, and a radical policy shift. Its key purpose, as Jordan et al 
have shown, was the integration of water quality and supply management at a time 
when the industry was turning to water re-use as the principal method of expanding 
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water resources to meet escalating demand. Sewerage agencies were expected to 
prioritise effluent treatment more effectively if also responsible for water quality and 
supply.29 But the shift to river-basin scale had as much to do with a wider move 
towards regionalism – with precedents in the 1940s energy nationalisations – as with 
hydrological imperatives. River catchments were not in themselves inevitably the 
optimal scale for water services. As his department prepared to report on water 
reform in 1968, Labour’s local government minister Lord Kennet noted that: 
“too much stress should not be laid on the importance of integrated 
river basin management; there were many river basins in England 
and Wales, but only three represented distinctive large areas, and 
therefore it was not feasible … to think of taking river catchments as 
the sole determinant … .”30 
Once the principle of regional authorities had been established, their boundaries were decided 
on distinctly “hydrosocial” grounds in relation to land-use planning. As an official noted in 
1971: “Given a minimum level of financial strength the significant criteria for determining 
the boundaries … seemed to be population and, to a lesser, extent, area.” London was part of 
the “‘central deficiency zone’ of south east England.” The decision to make the Thames stand 
alone, however, rather than merge with the river authority to the north – though desirable in 
unifying the ‘South Eastern Planning Region” – was to avoid creating “an unwieldy and too 
powerful South Eastern regional body.” TWA was the only single-catchment RWA.31 
Alongside questions of scale and efficiency, Ministry officials also had to consider public 
reactions to terminating local government's traditional environmental functions. The 1969 
Kennet Report implied that for local democracy the horse had already bolted:  
“bearing in mind that water operations are subordinated to planning 
…, there is not much scope for local democracy in what are 
primarily technological matters, and … it cannot be seriously 
maintained that local democracy nowadays functions in this field 
significantly in practice. It is on conservation … that local 
authorities’ and the public’s interest principally centres … . But 
geography prevents local authorities being responsible for 
conservation.”32  
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Another report stated that “in large matters of this kind decisions will always effectively be 
taken by central government and not by river authorities.”33 Jordan et al have noted the extent 
to which the reformers relied on assumptions of local authority inefficiency and on 
management models provided by electricity and gas. These deliberations demonstrate, too, 
the silencing of political questions about water resources by references to ‘technological 
matters’ and ‘geography’.34 Official policy initially settled on small, managerial RWA boards 
but this underestimated the effect of a transformation on this scale which generated 
widespread opposition. The pre-1973 water industry was a mixed economy of public and 
private undertakings. Discussing in 1971 whether to replace water and sewage undertakings 
with multi- or single purpose authorities, civil servant Jack Beddoe considered it "doubtful 
whether either solution will create much general public interest.” “Only last year,” he noted, 
“five local authority water undertakings transferred to a statutory company in Essex without a 
vestige of public interest.”35 But the "gigantic" scale of the authorities and the rupture of 
localised provider/consumer relations were the problem for many, alongside questions of 
ownership. The Conservative Government’s decision to retain private statutory water 
companies while replacing public undertakings fuelled cross-party clashes.36 
Among the most vocal of local government bodies opposing the plans was the Greater 
London Council (GLC), created in 1965 with an area five times larger than the LCC, who 
insisted on the ‘special circumstances of London.” “London’s river,” GLC leader Sir 
Desmond Plummer wrote to the Environment Minister, was “an absolutely fundamental part” 
of the Council’s environmental planning. It was “inconceivable” that the “river and the water 
services which affect every Londoner personally should be managed by some other unelected 
authority,” when the city provided “70% of the population and financial base.” As “the 
natural choice of organisation”, the GLC had two proposals. Their suggestion of a GLC-run 
river basin was rejected by the Minister on the grounds that for the GLC to manage “water 
services in … [an] extensive rural area and in towns like Banbury and Cirencester” would 
“from the point of view of … overall democratic control, …. be much inferior to the original 
proposal.” Their alternative, a “London Regional Water Authority” for the catchment of the 
tidal river below Teddington, did not address the need to expand London's supplies.37 The 
TWA was established as a separate organisation, though the GLC gained river amenity 
functions, justified by the Government on the grounds of “the unique position of the River 
Thames as a national rather than a purely local, asset.”38 The major frustration for the 
reformers nationally, in failing to transfer land drainage to RWAs, also affected London. The 
11 
GLC retained land drainage and flood defence for the Thames and other “main metropolitan 
water courses.”39 
In promoting the river basin as the "natural" unit for water management, the 1973 Act de-
naturalised the relationship between local authorities and environmental functions that had 
become integral to their role. Local government links with water and sewerage proved 
politically impossible to sever altogether at this point, however. A compromise allowed for a 
majority of local authority representatives on the RWAs, though as Keating and Rhodes have 
said, this created a fundamental ambiguity: representatives were expected to “discard local 
interests” which were also their “distinctive contribution.” Labour Member of Parliament 
Dennis Howell later pointed out that: “[t]he great difficulty created by the Water Act … was 
that it was not based on any known unit of democratic accountability.” Peter Black, TWA 
Chairman and GLC Conservative, tried to sound optimistic in 1978, referring to central 
government edicts: 
“Despite the problems which will arise, the authority believe that the 
unique constitution of water authorities – part nationalised 
industry/part local government – ensures that they can respond 
wisely.”40  
 
The exclusion of local authorities from water, sewerage and river management was finally 
accomplished by the 1983 Water Act, which ended statutory local authority representation on 
RWAs and implicitly re-framed water citizens as customers through the establishment of 
Consultative Consumer Committees. In 1984 TWA Chairman Roy Watts, who steered the 
authority to privatisation, introduced the new appointed board as a seamless evolution. With 
15 members (replacing 62), it was 
“more independent and … intended to add to the basic and 
unchanging requirements of continuously improving service to 
customers, an even greater pursuit of efficiency as well as some of 
the disciplines of the market place. It seeks to deal only with policy, 
strategy and performance monitoring and to do so without the 
proliferation of Committees which marked the previous 
arrangements.”41  
12 
The GLC itself was abolished in 1986 and its land drainage, flood protection and river 
amenity functions transferred to the TWA.42 At this point London’s formal political 
relationship to the Thames environment was lost. 
The rise of river basins, then, contributed to the decline of long-standing local and 
metropolitan government functions. RWAs reflected a new managerial imperative that also 
saw the removal of the GLC and other bodies from the PLA board during these years. They 
facilitated increasing central government control: historian Asok Mukhopadhyay called them 
the “the regional arms of Whitehall”.43 The democratic structures of local and metropolitan 
government, however, had never been sufficient either for the boundary-crossing nature of 
rivers or for competing interests between river users, riparian owners, water consumers, 
amenity and environmental groups. Conflicts around water and river rights have been a 
breeding ground for interest groups emerging in the gaps between formal routes for public 
participation and accountability. 
 
VI Civil Society, Governance and the Thames 
Some civil society organisations sprang from the closure of formal representative channels. 
After GLC abolition some of its leading members and officials sought to influence policy for 
the river, docks and riverside through the London Rivers Association (1986-2007). Numerous 
local organisations were mobilised by the closure and commercial redevelopment of 
London’s up-river docks in the 1970s and ’80s, as central government transferred the 
planning powers of riparian boroughs to the London Docklands Development Corporation 
(LDDC, 1981-1998).44 But interest groups have a longer history in the Thames region. 
Sometimes they were a response to crises. Severe flooding in East Molesey, Surrey, in 1968 
prompted action from the Molesey Residents Association (1965-) and the Flood Victims 
Campaign.45 The River Thames Society (1962-) and Thames Planning and Amenities Forum 
(TPAF) (1965-96) represent more long-term engagement with planning and recreational 
issues and pressure for statutory protection. The River Thames Society supported GLC bids 
for continuing membership of the Port of London Authority board in the 1960s and early 
‘70s, to promote neglected amenity interests on the tideway. TPAF, representing both local 
authorities and amenity groups, for a time sought planning authority status to provide a “wide 
vision for the whole river.”46 
13 
After the formation of RWAs in 1974, civil society groups continued to produce collective 
responses to problems of river and water management. TPAF and the Cotswolds River 
Action Group opposed TWA’s plan to increase abstractions from the Cotswolds limestone at 
a public inquiry in 1980. Most vocal was TPAF member Frederick Freeth, Wiltshire County 
Council’s “rebel” on the TWA. But the river basin has proved a problematic scale for popular 
protest. The persistence of localised pressure groups and, especially in recent years, the 
proliferation of tributary or sub-catchment organisations suggests that social activism is still 
more readily mobilised at local level. But the context for such organisations is crucial: for all 
this vibrant local activity, the ability to affect decisions has been highly variable between 
different groups and over time.47 
Recent literature on "multi-level governance" provides a framework for considering changing 
forms of political engagement along the Thames and its tributaries in the context of a shifting 
relationship between civil society and the state. The years following the Conservative 
election victory in 1979 have been widely associated with the death of consensus over the 
role of the state in welfare and other services in the UK, the decline of local government and 
the transfer of key state functions to the market-place and civil sphere. Geographical and 
political science literature has explored a shift “from government to governance,” implying a 
move away from fixed representational modes of government towards a range of new 
institutions, public-private partnerships and networks at local level. "Re-scaling" is central to 
these discussions and several, sometimes contradictory, trends have been identified: "scaling-
up,” suggesting both the loss of local powers to central government and the erosion of 
national sovereignty by Europe; "scaling-out,” entailing the transfer of public services to the 
market-place but also greater involvement of “non-state actors” (commercial bodies, 
stakeholders, interest groups) in decision-making; "scaling-down,” including an expanded 
role for local groups.48 
Water and sewerage privatisation in England and Wales in 1989 "scaled-out" key regional 
functions to the market. It also led, however, to unprecedented levels of national regulation 
for water resources and rivers, with an economic regulator (OFWAT) and two environmental 
regulators: the National Rivers Authority (Environment Agency since 1996) and Drinking 
Water Inspectorate. Environmental concerns have been tied to market mechanisms within this 
framework. Increasingly, too, environmental expertise was internalised within water 
agencies, with important consequences for the management of pollution, abstraction, land 
drainage, flood risk and ecologically sensitive sites.49 River-basin management has coincided 
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since the late 1970s with the "scaling-up" of regulation for rivers and water: European Union 
environmental directives have been powerful drivers in expanding national regulation, 
especially since privatisation, also providing potential supra-national pathways for local 
activists. Tower Hamlets Federation of Tenants in east London cited the Drinking Water 
Directive when in 1986 they successfully complained to Europe over nitrate levels in their 
TWA supply. The Water Framework Directive (WFD, 2000) has required the production of 
river-basin management plans, introduced targets for the “ecological status” of rivers, and 
obliged member states to “encourage the active involvement of all interested parties,” 
implying a degree of unspecified "scaling-down".50 
The ongoing controversy over Axford illuminates some important changes in the role of civil 
society organisations over time. Since the 1950s the River Kennet has been a site of conflict 
between the perceived interests of water consumers and those interested in the Kennet as an 
environment, amenity and local resource.51 The private water users and amenity interests of 
the Kennet Valley lost out to Swindon’s consumers in the 1960s. Despite influential local 
support, they lacked the resources of Swindon Borough backed by Thames Conservancy and 
central government's regional policies. When leading consultant engineers declined to advise 
them, they resorted in 1959 to a water diviner to try to find alternative water sources for 
Swindon. Swindon officials pronounced confidently on the likely impacts of the abstraction: 
“[t]here should be little or no effect in Kennet river as there 
appeared to be no direct communication between the water in the 
underground formation and the water in the river.”52  
Over 50 years later, the Axford pumping station continues to be controversial, however. The 
impacts of groundwater abstraction on rivers are now acknowledged to be imperfectly 
understood. In the 1990s the Environment Agency (EA) and Thames Water (by then a private 
company) clashed over the renewal of Axford's abstraction license. Following the grant of a 
new temporary license in 2008, a joint study by Thames Water, EA and Natural England 
(another government agency) is said to have concluded that “abstraction was contributing to 
low flows but, due to the complex nature of the systems, it was difficult to demonstrate 
specific evidence of direct adverse impact on the environment.”53 A new local organization, 
Action for the River Kennet (ARK), has campaigned against deteriorating river conditions 
since 1990, calling for an end to the abstraction. They have worked in recent years with 
influential environmental NGOs such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), as well as the statutory EA and Natural England. A current 
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policy of reducing Swindon’s reliance on Axford is tied to pressure for the Kennet to reach 
“good ecological status” under the EU’s WFD. 
 
Conclusion 
Today’s more porous borders between the civil and statutory spheres in river and water 
management highlight the brittle separations of earlier decades. Oppositional groups today 
have levels of access to information on water policy that would have been unthinkable in the 
1960s. The WFD's ecological benchmarks for rivers underpin a re-appraisal of sub-
catchments in the Thames basin and elsewhere.54 This situation currently hinges on a tense 
balance between the EU, national government and the regulatory agencies it funds. The rise 
of influential environmental NGOs – with expertise and access to national and international 
policy circles – has played a crucial role in shaping the changing regulatory landscape.55 
River basins in England and Wales are neither watershed democracies nor post-political. 
They are the product both of their regulatory contexts and of the range of official and 
unofficial participatory avenues open to different groups at any given time. The impacts of 
river-basin management on political space in the Thames region between the 1960s and 
1980s were not straightforward. London’s political institutions undeniably lost both decision-
making powers and the symbolic power conferred by environmental management of the 
river. The opening of the GLC’s Thames Flood Barrier in 1984 just before abolition 
symbolizes the abrupt end. In terms of the allocation of water resources, however, London 
and other key towns were the winners in the Thames catchment during this period, with 
expanded ecological hinterlands. The localised priorities of less populated rural districts in 
the catchment were downgraded. It remains to be seen what effect Defra's recent [sub-
]"catchment based” initiative has on this local/regional balance.56 While localized 
communities of interest were subsumed within new regional divisions, new communities of 
interest have continued to emerge in the civil sphere.  
During the heyday of “representative” management up to the 1960s, there was frequent 
criticism of the river's fragmented governance and the failure to represent a full range of 
interests and communities. The potential for competing interests along the river is as strong 
as ever, and the uneven battle between the priorities and resources of local interest groups and 
those of central government remains a key problem for environmental citizenship. The power 
of different groups is still tied to their consonance with official policies. The government can 
16 
do much to change the balance of central/local power at any time.57 But this is not a story of 
rivers lost to their citizens. The emergence of greater consensus over environmental issues 
combined with an expanded regulatory structure and more powerful activist organisations has 
shaped new modes of participation and accountability for rivers that exceed what was on 
offer from representative local bodies up to the 1970s. However technocratic much current 
discussion and literature on river basins undoubtedly is,58 public pressure continually bubbles 
up through civil society organisations and the tactical use of political and legal avenues that 
are now more widely available. River basins are not (yet) the cohesive engines of governance 
that the water reformers of the 1970s may have been hoping for. Fragmentation of decision-
making processes for the Thames and its catchment remains an obstacle to effective action 





                                                     
* Thanks to the Economic and Social Research Council for Research Grant ES/I031502/1, University of 
Greenwich, Sarah Palmer, Yvonne Rydin and Sue Tapsell, the editors of this volume, two anonymous referees, 
the Rachel Carson Center, Munich, Dominic Martyn (Environment Agency), Action for River Kennet. 
1 For more on the Water Act, see Section IV. 
2 W.J. Luckin, Pollution and Control: A Social History of the Thames in the Nineteenth Century (Bristol: Hilger, 
1986); Christopher Hamlin, A Science of Impurity: Water Analysis in Nineteenth Century Britain (Bristol: 
Hilger, 1990); Richard H. Trainor, “The “Decline” of British Urban Governance Since 1850: A Reassessment,” 
in Urban Governance: Britain and Beyond Since 1750, eds. Robert J. Morris and Richard H. Trainor 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 47-68. 
3 On ecological hinterland, see e.g.: Graham Haughton, Ian Rowe and Colin Hunter, “The Thames Gateway and 
the Re-Emergence of Regional Strategic Planning: The Implications for Water Resource Management,” The 
Town Planning Review 68 (1997): 407-22. 
4 Donald Worster, “Watershed Democracy: Recovering the Lost Vision of John Wesley Powell,” Journal of 
Land, Resources, & Environmental Law 23 (2003): 65; Olivier Graefe, “River Basins as New Environmental 
Regions? The Depolitization of Water Management,” Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 14 (2011): 26; 
David Marquand, The Decline of the Public: The Hollowing Out of Citizenship (Cambridge: Polity, 2004). 
5 e.g. Neil Brenner, “Metropolitan Institutional Reform and the Rescaling of State Space in Contemporary 
Western Europe,” European Urban and Regional Studies 10 (2003): 299. 
17 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6 David Kinnersley, Troubled Water: Rivers, Politics and Pollution (London: Hilary Shipman Ltd, 1988), 2; 
Barry M. Doyle, introduction to Urban Politics and Space in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Regional 
Perspectives, ed. Barry M. Doyle (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007), 15. 
7 José E. Castro, Maria Kaïka and Erik Swyngedouw, “London: Structural Continuities and Institutional Change 
in Water Management,” European Planning Studies 11 (2003): 287. See also n. 60. 
8 Donald Snow, “The Persistence of Powell: The Idea of Watersheds and Participatory Democracy,” Journal of 
Land, Resources, & Environmental Law (2003): 31-40; Erwin C. Hargrove, Prisoners of Myth: The Leadership 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1933-1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). See, however: 
François Molle, “River-Basin Planning and Management: The Social Life of a Concept,” Geoforum 40 (2009): 
484–94; W.A. Maloney and J. Richardson, Managing Policy Change in Britain: the Politics of Water, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995). Judith Petts, “Learning about Learning: Lessons from Public 
Engagement and Deliberation on Urban River Restoration,” The Geographical Journal 173 (2007): 300–311 
9 Vanessa Taylor and Frank Trentmann, "Liquid Politics: Water and the Politics of Everyday Life in the Modern 
City," Past and Present 211 (2011): 199-241; John Sheail, "Government and the Perception of Reservoir 
Development in Britain: An Historical Perspective," Planning Perspectives 1 (1986): 45–60. 
10 Matthew Flinders, ‘MPs and Icebergs: Parliament and Delegated Governance’, Parliamentary Affairs 57 
(2004): 768; Ben Pimlott and Nirmala Rao, “Metropolitan Miasma: Blurred Accountabilities in the Governance 
of London,” The London Journal 29 (2004): 33-45. Ben Page, “Results of the Case Study on the Water Supply 
in the Region of London, UK”, Appendix to Hubert Heinelt et al, Final Report: Achieving Sustainable and 
Innovative Policies through Participatory Governance in a Multi-level Context (EU Project No. HPSE-CT-
1949-00028, 2002), 232.  
11 John Davis, Reforming London: The London Government Problem, 1855–1900 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988); John Davis, “London Government 1850–1920: The Metropolitan Board of Works and the London 
County Council,” The London Journal 26 (2001): 47–56; Bill Luckin, “The Metropolitan and the Municipal: 
The Politics of Health and Environment in London, 1860-1920,” in Cities of Ideas: Governance and Citizenship 
in Urban Britain, eds. Robert Colls and Richard Rodger (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 46–66. 
12 Flinders, “MPs and Icebergs,” 771. William Robson, The Government and Misgovernment of London 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1939), 114-20, 135-8. 
13 Luckin, “Metropolitan and the Municipal,” 66; James Gillespie, “Muncipalism, Monopoly and Management: 
The Demise of ‘Socialism in One County’, 1918-1933,” in Politics and the People of London: The London 
County Council 1889-1965, ed. Andrew Saint (London: The Hambledon Press, 1989), 105, 109; Stephen 
Inwood, A History of London (London: Macmillan, 1998), 709. For public participation, see also: A. 
Skeffington, People and Planning: Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning (London: 
HMSO, 1969); John Davis, “‘Simple Solutions to Complex Problems:’ The Greater London Council and the 
Greater London Development Plan, 1965-1973,” in Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, 
Institutions, ed. José Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 249-74. 
18 
                                                                                                                                                                     
14 J. Abbernethy evidence, 1877 (371) Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords [HL] on 
Conservancy Boards, &c, 1877, Q. 423. Mr Pugh, “River Conservancy and Floods Prevention Bill”, House of 
Commons [HC] Debate, Hansard, Vol. 260, cc. 958-962, April 7, 1881. 
15 “The Water Supply of London,” The Times, July 19, 1892, 8. See also: J. Prestwich, A Geological Inquiry 
Respecting the Water-bearing Strata of the Country around London … (London: 1851); "Mr. Bailey Denton's 
Plan," 1868-69 [4169] Royal Commission on Water Supply, Report, Part II, No. 68; R. Etheridge, “On the 
Rivers of the Cotteswold Hills … as Supply to the Main River and the Metropolis,” Proceedings of the 
Cotteswold Naturalists' Field Club, 11 Part 1 (1892-93): 49-101; John Broich, “London’s and Surrey’s ‘Fight 
for the River’: Politics, Perceptions and the Thames, 1897,” Surrey History VI (2000): 75-90; John Sheail, 
“Underground Water Abstraction: Indirect Effects of Urbanization on the Countryside,” Journal of Historical 
Geography, 8 (1982): 395-408. For an 1894 Thames basin map see: "Researching the River Thames" website, 
accessed November 14, 2015, http://www2.gre.ac.uk/about/faculty/ach/research/centres/maritime/research/case-
studies/runningriverthames/timeline/maps/river-thames-and-thames-basin. 
16 Elizabeth Porter, Water Management in England and Wales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 
19-23. 
17 John Sheail, “Planning, Water Supplies and Ministerial Power in Inter-War Britain,” Public Administration, 
61 (1983): 386-95; John Hassan, “The Water Industry 1900-1951: A Failure of Public Policy?,” in The Political 
Economy of Nationalisation in Britain 1920-1950, eds. R. Millward and J. Singleton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 189-211. For RWAs' failure to integrate with local authority planning: Yvonne Rydin, 
Urban and Environmental Planning in the UK (1993; Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edn. 2003), 162-
63. 
18 Metropolitan Water Board [MWB], London’s Water Supply, 1903-1953 (London: Staples Press, 1953), 311-
12. TNA: HLG 50/2250: Departmental Committee on Greater London Water Supplies [DCGLWS]: Verbatim 
Notes 1947: Maxwell Fyfe, March 10, 1947, 6; Sir Cyril Radcliffe: April 21, 1947, 126. HLG 50/2264: 
DCGLWS: Review of Technical Evidence 1949: MWB, “A Review of the Resources and Consumption of 
Water in the Great London Area by P.G.H. Boswell,” 4. 
19 TNA: HLG 50/2263: Ministry of Health, Report of the Departmental Committee on Greater London Water 
Supplies (London: HMSO, 1948), 8, 11. HLG50/2261: “DCGLWS. Statement of Evidence by the Metropolitan 
Boroughs' Standing Joint Committee” (June 20, 1947), 2; LCC, “Statement of Evidence” [undated], 5. HLG 
50/2248: DCGLWS: Report. Memo: Mr Armer to Sir John Wrigley, 7 July 1948; MWB, London’s Water 
Supply, 316. A.K. Mukhopadhyay, “The Politics of London Water,” The London Journal, 1 (1975): 212-17. 
20 Glyn, “Water Resources,” HL Debate, Hansard, Vol. 204, c. 99, May 29, 1957; B.J. Hardcastle, “From 
concept to commissioning,” in Thames Ground Water Scheme, eds. ICE (London: ICE, 1978), 5. “Boring may 
solve London’s water problem,” The Times, June 24, 1963, 6; “Topping up the Thames,” The Times, February 
17, 1967, 2. 
21 Newbury Weekly News, October 28, 1965, 22; Letter from Richard Nugent, The Times, October 8, 1965, 13; 
Letter from Lord Hurd, The Times, October 7, 1965, 13; “Water Plan for London makes Farmers Angry,” The 
19 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Times, October 23, 1965, 5; “Correction,” The Times, October 27, 1965, 12; “Opening Address,” in Thames 
Ground Water Scheme, eds. ICE, 2-3; Cirencester Public Inquiry 1980: The Wilts and Gloucestershire 
Standard: June 27, 1980, 1; December 5, 1980, 1. "No. 2007 Water, England and Wales, The Thames Water 
Authority (Gatehampton Farm Boreholes) Order 1987;" "Gatehampton Borehole Upgrade," accessed November 
14, 2015, http://www.gpsuk.com/casestudy/8/6/gatehampton-borehole-upgrade.html. 
22 Porter, Water Management, 25. 
23 Berkshire Record Office [BRO]: D/EX 423/6/25: Letter from (Secretary) Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government [MHLG] to Town Clerk, Swindon Corporation, 30 March 1960 [Result of Public Inquiry]. 
24 e.g. “Water Supplies of England: Lord Desborough’s Warning,” The Times, November 15, 1927, 13; Thames 
Conservancy, The Thames Conservancy, 1857-1957 (London: Thames Conservancy, 1957), 46.  
25 BRO: D/EX 423/6/25: Prof. H.L. Hawkins, “Report to the Kennet Valley Protection Association on the 
Proposal by Swindon Corporation …” (July 1958), 3. 
26 BRO: D/EX 423/6/25: Letter from (Secretary) MHLG to Town Clerk, Swindon Corporation, 30 March 1960; 
Note by Godwin, Bembridge and Clifton, 8 June 1959; Water Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo 6. Ch. 22, S. 8. For 
earlier abstractions in the Kennet, see: Atkins W S Consultants Ltd, Kennet and Coln: River Levels Study Final 
Report, Volume 1. River Kennet. Report to National Rivers Authority [NRA] Thames Region (1992). Accessed 
November 14, 2015, http://ea-lit.freshwaterlife.org/archive/ealit:3650/OBJ/20001620.pdf. For key towns: 
MHLG/Minister for Welsh Affairs, The South-East Study (London: HMSO, 1964), “Appendix 1: Water 
Supplies in South-East England,” 54-59. 
27 TNA: HLG 127/1212: “Report of the MHLG on the Port of London Bill: Preamble” (April 7, 1964),” No. 7. 
28 Castro, Kaïka and Swyngedouw. “London,” 287. The RWAs took on the duties of 1,580 former bodies. 
Porter, Water Management, 28; Daniel A. Okun, Regionalization of Water Management: A Revolution in 
England and Wales (London: Applied Science Publishers, 1977), 147. 
29 Water Resources Board, Water Supplies in South East England (London: HMSO, 1966), 11-12; Hassan, 
History of Water, 123-24; A.G. Jordan, J. J. Richardson and R.H. Kimber, “The Origins of the Water Act 1973,” 
Public Administration, 55 (1977), 319-20. 
30 TNA: HLG 127/1073: “Water Reorganisation: Note of a Meeting chaired by Lord Kennet on 10th May 
1968,” No. 3(f, g). Local government was also being reconsidered at this time. Report of the Royal Commission 
on Local Government (London HMSO, 1969); Local Government Act 1972, Ch. 70.  
31 TNA: HLG 127/1506: “Implementation of CAWC Report, Note of a Meeting held on 3 March 1971,”No. 
2(i); Department of the Environment (DoE), “Water Reorganisation” (undated, c. March 1971), No. 4(iv); 
“Implementation of CAWC Report. Notes of a Meeting held on 26 Feb 1971,” No. 4(v). For hydrosocial cycles: 
Karen Bakker, An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatizing Water in England and Wales (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 28-29; Erik Swyngedouw, “The Political Economy and Political Ecology of the Hydro-
Social Cycle,” Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education 142 (2009): 56–60. For the construction 
20 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of regions: Allan Cochrane, “Making up a Region: The Rise and Fall of the ‘South East of England' as a 
Political Territory,” Environment and Planning – Part C 30 (2012): 95-108. 
32 HLG 127/1073: Kennet, “Water Reorganisation,” No. 8; MHLG, “Local Government Reform Water 
Functions and Organisation,” April 16, 1969, No. 4 (Memo by M. Stevenson); Lord Kennet, “Water 
Reorganisation,” [Kennet Report] June 1, 1969, Appendix B: “Relationship to Local Government”. 
33 TNA: HLG 1271/1073. “Paper 13. Water Organisation: Relationship to Local Government” (undated), Part 
III, No. 29. 
34 Jordan et al, "Origins of the Water Act," 324. On technology and silences: Bruno Latour, Science in Action 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 2-3, 21. 
35 TNA: HLG 127/1506: J.E. Beddoe memo, “CAWC Report on the Organisation of the Water industry in 
England and Wales” (February 1971), No. 17.  
36 e.g. Gloucestershire Archives [GA]: D6804/1/7: Cotswold Water Board Minutes, 1972-74: “British 
Waterworks Association: Vice-Chairman’s Report on Proceedings … 20th-23rd June 1972,” 2; Surrey History 
Centre [SHC]: 6128/1/84: East Surrey Water Company. Annual Report and Accounts for the Year ended 25th 
March 1971, Chairman’s Statement, 7. Okun, Regionalization of Water Management, 95. 
37 TNA: MT 88/327: D. Plummer (GLC) letter to P. Walker (DoE), February 9, 1972; HLG 29/1244. E. 
Griffiths (DoE) letter to D. Plummer, August 15, 1972, 1-2. For Greater London and neighbouring boundaries, 




38 TNA: MT 88/327. “Draft Paragraphs on Water Reorganisation …" [Lord Greenwood's Speech to River 
Thames Society, 21 September 1973]; Okun, Regionalization of Water Management, 69, 86-88, 148-9. 
39 The GLC was responsible for land drainage in the “London Excluded Area” (approx. 400 m2 / 1040 km2). 
E.C. Penning-Rowsell, D.J. Parker and D.M. Harding, Floods and Drainage: British Policies for Hazard 
Reduction, Agricultural Improvement and Wetland Conservation (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 45. 
40 M. Keating and M. Rhodes, “Politics or Technocracy? The Regional Water Authorities,” Political Quarterly 
(1981): 488-9; Howell, "Water Authorities (Constitution)," HC Debate, Hansard, Vol. 965, c. 1322, April 4, 
1979; Wilts & Swindon History Centre [WSHC]: K7/130/1: Thames Water, Annual Report and Accounts for the 
Year ended 31st March 1978, 5, 41. In 1978 TWA had 57 members: 36 local government representatives (20 
from London); 21 government appointees. 
41 My emphasis. [WSHC]: K7/130/1: Thames Water, Annual Report and Accounts … for the Year Ended 31st 
March 1984, 3. For citizens becoming consumers: Bakker, Uncooperative Commodity, 26; cf. Taylor and 
Trentmann, "Liquid Politics." 
42 Local Government Act 1985; Local Government Act 1985 (Land Drainage Functions) Order 1986; Thames 
Barrier and Flood Prevention Act 1972 (Amendment) Order 1986. 
21 
                                                                                                                                                                     
43 Jordan et al, “Origins of the Water Act,”: 317-34; Graham Taylor, State Regulation and the Politics of Public 
Service: The Case of the Water Industry (London: Mansell, 1999), 78-80; Bakker, Uncooperative Commodity, 
60; Mukhopadhyay, “Politics of London Water,” 224; Vanessa Taylor, “Whose River? London and the Thames 
Estuary, 1960-2014,” The London Journal 40 (2015): 252. 
44 Museum of London Docklands [MOLD], Port and River Collection: London Rivers Association papers 
[Aspinall collection]. Marjorie Mayo, Ines Newman and Nick Sharman, “Rebuilding London’s Docklands: The 
Strategic Plan – Two Years On,” Community Development Journal, 15 (1980): 68; P. Pinch, “Waterspace 
Planning and the River Thames in London,” London Journal 40 (2015): 272-92. 
45 SHC: 3696/19/12: Flood Victims Campaign; 8416: Ember Action Group Papers. See also: Thames 
Preservation Society (1890s); Underground Water Protection Society (1902); Thames Tributaries Power Users 
Association (1920s); Pure Rivers Society (1930s). 
46 R. Gresham-Cooke MP, “River Thames,” HC Debate, Hansard, Vol. 749, c. 1225, July 3, 1967. See also: 
BRO: D/EX 1465, TPAF Records; MOLD: British Ports Association 95: 'PLA Inquiry, 7, 8, 9 November 1966 
(Proposed Revision Order) Verbatim Report: Third Day, RTS evidence (RTS), 10-14: Proposed Reconstitution 
of the PLA: Public Inquiries and Working Papers (1966-1974) (Box 1.1): Port of London Revision Order Public 
Inquiry, 22-25 July 1974: Third Day, RTS evidence, 28-29. 
47 The Wilts and Gloucestershire Standard: May 2, 1980, 2; June 27, 1980, 1; July 4, 1980, 14; GA: 
DA22/132/132: TPAF Minutes, 26 June 1968, 1. For river basin protest, see Yorkshire WaterWatch: G. 
Haughton, “Private Profits – Public Drought: The Creation of a Crisis in Water Management for West 
Yorkshire,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 23 (1998): 419-433. Comparing watersheds 
and “polycentric … subwatershed communities of interest”: William Blomquist and Edella Schlagerb, “Political 
Pitfalls of Integrated Watershed Management,” Society & Natural Resources 18 (2005): 101-117. On problems 
of a “generally applicable typology” for state/non-state actor relationships, see Rydin, Urban and Environmental 
Planning, 116. 
48 J. Kooiman, ed. Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions (London: Sage, 1993); M. 
Goldsmith and J. Garrard, “Urban Governance: Some Reflections,” in Urban Governance, eds. Morris and 
Trainor; Nigel Watson, Hugh Deeming and Raphael Treffny, “Beyond Bureaucracy? Assessing Institutional 
Change in the Governance of Water in England,” Water Alternatives 2 (2009): 448‐60; Maureen G. Reed and 
Shannon Bruyneel, “Rescaling Environmental Governance, Rethinking the State: A Three-Dimensional 
Review,” Progress in Human Geography 34 (2010): 646–53. 
49 Bakker, Uncooperative Commodity; Jeremy Purseglove, Taming the Flood: History and Natural History of 
Rivers and Wetlands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
50 F. Craig and P. Craig, Britain’s Poisoned Water (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1989), 118. EU Water 
Framework Directive, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/index_en.html. For recent 
consultation on river basin management plans, see: Environment Agency, Water for Life and Livelihoods: 
Consultation on the Draft Update to the River Basin Management Plans - Summary Response Document (2014), 
22 
                                                                                                                                                                     
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/452286/Water_for_life_and_livel
ihoods_-_Summary_response_document.pdf. Both accessed August 12, 2015. 
51 On post-privatization consumer/environment conflicts: Bakker, Uncooperative Commodity. 
52 BRO: D/EX 423/6/25: Borough of Swindon: Proposed Water Abstraction – Kennet Valley. Notes of a 
Meeting at Civic Offices, Swindon, June 16, 1958; KVPA Minutes, October 23, 1959; Letter from Jepson 
Turner to KVPA, December 9, 1959. 
53 WWF, WWF-UK Case Study: The Impact of Over-Abstraction on the River Kennet (WWF/Natural England, 
undated; c. 2011), 3, citing “Axford Licence Variation Application, Environmental Report” (Thames Water 
Utilities Ltd: August 2007), accessed February 9, 2014, 
http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/case_study_kennet_final.pdf; Water Briefing, “Thames Water Wins Two 
Year Extraction Licence Extension” (May 9, 2011), accessed February 11, 2014. 
http://www.waterbriefing.org/index.php/home/company-news/item/4176-thames-water-wins-two-year-
extraction-licence-extension; http://www.riverkennet.org/. See also NRA report at n. 34. 
54 Thanks to Dave Webb, Biodiversity Team Leader, SE Area, Thames Region, EA. Oral History Interview: 
February 15, 2011. 
55 On NGOs' influence and limits: M. Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern 
Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
56 For London and the region, see also Castro, Kaïka and Swyngedouw, “London,” 287. Defra, Catchment 
Based Approach: Improving the Quality of our Water Environment: A Policy Framework to Encourage the 
Wider Adoption of an Integrated Catchment Based Approach to Improving the Quality of our Water 
Environment (2013). Accessed November 14, 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/204231/pb13934-water-
environment-catchment-based-approach.pdf. 
57 e.g. LDDC, abolition of metropolitan counties (1986), and recent announcement on fracking: Adam Vaughan, 
“Government will step in if councils don't fast-track fracking applications,” The Guardian (UK), 13 August 
2015, accessed August 13, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/13/government-will-step-
in-if-councils-dont-fast-track-fracking-applications?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other. 
58 Hubert Heinelt et al, Final Report, 49. Accessed November 14, 2015, 
http://cordis.europa.eu/documents/documentlibrary/82608091EN6.pdf. 
